

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP

TO:

		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	EXDIR		X		
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7	DDO		X		
8	DDS&T				
9	Chm/NIC		X		
10	GC				
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/Pers				
14	D/OLL				
15	D/PAO				
16	SA/IA				
17	AO/DCI				
18	C/IPD/OIS				
19	ANIO/USSR		X		
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SUSPENSE _____
Date

Remarks

Executive Secretary
20 Nov 84
Date

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United States Department of State



Washington, D.C. 20520

XR-8431436

Executive Registry

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TO : NSC - Mr. Robert Kimmitt 8431437
✓ CIA -
USIA - Mr. C. William LaSalle 8431439

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SUBJECT : IPC Meeting on UNESCO, November 9, 1984

Attached are the minutes of the first IPC meeting on UNESCO. You will note the second IPC meeting is scheduled for November 21, 1984, 2:30 p.m., Room 7240 Main State. Additional background materials and the agenda for the next meeting will be forwarded separately.

Covey
Charles Hill
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As stated

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International Political Committee (IPC)
UNESCO

November 9, 1984, 2:15-3:15 p.m.
Room 7240, Main State

Minutes

Attendees:

Under Secretary Armacost - Chairman
Charles Courtney - USIA
Ralph DeVries - White House
Joel Fischman - USIA
Gerald Helman - State/P
[redacted] CIA
Gregory Newell - State/IO
Miles Pendleton - State/P
Walter Raymond - NSC
Steve Steiner - NSC
Gray Handley - State/IO

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The Chairman stated that the IPC's purpose was to assess what had been accomplished in reform by UNESCO during 1984, and to consider any relevant views of the U.S. National Commission for UNESCO, the General Accounting Office, the Congress, and our allies. The IPC would evaluate information provided and compare the reforms which had occurred against the backdrop of our initial concerns which led to the U.S. withdrawal announcement. The IPC would offer the White House its judgment of the extent to which reform was achieved.

The Chairman also identified two collateral questions for IPC consideration. First, what U.S.-UNESCO liaison arrangements would be necessary should we withdraw to protect continuing U.S. interests. Second, assuming withdrawal, guidelines ought to be developed to determine under what conditions we might re-enter the Organization, and a strategy ought to be developed to maximize our opportunity to do so. The Chairman completed his opening remarks by mentioning that the protection of Americans in UNESCO and the reduction of Soviet influence were also important objectives.

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- 2 -

Mr. Newell started the discussion by describing the process which led to the President's decision to withdraw from UNESCO. He noted that UNESCO had proven to be the least responsive of the UN organizations in the implementation of improvements requested by the United States. He also noted that the Organization had held one General Conference and two Executive Board meetings since we expressed our desires for reform and very little real improvement had resulted. He noted that during the last General Conference and the most recent Executive Board noticeable improvements in attitude were evident; however, there had been little evidence of real change on the program policy side. When the President made his decision to withdraw, it was based on the fact that only apparent attitudinal changes had occurred at the 22nd General Conference and it was deemed to be highly unlikely that further real reform would be forthcoming.

Mr. Newell then described the reform activities generated by member states and the UNESCO Secretariat following our announcement of withdrawal. He also noted that our own capabilities had been upgraded in the Department and in Paris to encourage the reform movement. Furthermore, the Secretary had established a distinguished panel to monitor any change that occurred. Mr. Newell described the efforts of various reform-oriented committees and groups, noting that their work had led to the acceptance of some limited reforms at the most recent Executive Board. He stated, however, that it appeared the reform which had been accepted was most likely only attitudinal and, therefore, would fall far short of our concerns as expressed at the end of last year and during 1984. A thorough analysis of the reform achieved was being prepared, and would be provided to the IPC. The IPC would also receive the final GAO Report, which would be finished in a few weeks, and the UNESCO Monitoring Panel Report. (As an aside, Mr. Newell stated that the Monitoring Panel had just completed its final deliberations within the hour and he was told that the Panel's unanimous conclusion was that there had not been significant and lasting reform in UNESCO.)

Mr. Newell completed his statement by describing the strategy being prepared to undertake alternative activities in UNESCO's areas of concentration, once we had withdrawn. He explained that these alternatives would offer more direct benefit to developing countries in program terms than did our current UNESCO participation. Following withdrawal, Mr. Newell stated that the U.S. planned to maintain an observer mission in Paris and to recommend that a committee of experts be constituted to continue working for reform in UNESCO and to watch for any reform which might occur. In closing, he stated that postponement of withdrawal should not be an option because we could continue to push strongly for reform as a non-member.

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- 3 -

Following Mr. Newell, Mr. Raymond explained that from the NSC point of view, all the options which might be available were worth considering. Mr. Raymond stated that he found the withdrawal decision correct and that he agreed change in UNESCO was essential. He noted, however, that the Western allies, with whom he had spoken in Paris, believed the goal of UNESCO reform was impossible to achieve within one year. They believed, therefore, that we should remain in UNESCO through the next General Conference in order to continue to work in collaboration with the Western group to complete the reform process. The allies believed that without the United States in UNESCO the reform process would dissipate. They apparently recognized, however, that any delay of our decision would require some additional commitment on their part. Mr. Raymond explained that, in his opinion, if one or more allies wrote to the DG and gave notice of their withdrawal, linked to the need for further reform, the reform movement would be strengthened considerably. Of course, he stated, it is not certain we could generate such letters; however, the option should be considered.

Mr. Raymond completed his statement by explaining that he believed our withdrawal could increase the credibility of the Organization while leaving the Soviets in positions of responsibility from which they could commit more mischief.

A brief discussion of the character of the President's withdrawal decision followed. The Chairman stated his understanding that the decision had been made to withdraw. Therefore, any other action, including a delay of withdrawal, would require another Presidential decision. He further stated that the effect of a new decision on the credibility of the President should be considered by the IPC. Mr. Raymond stated that if the President initially made the decision because we were unable to achieve reform, then the decision's purpose was to improve the Organization. If improvement has occurred, or if there is a reform process in motion, in Mr. Raymond's opinion, the IPC ought to consider telling the President there may be options available which would continue the reform process.

Ambassador Helman noted that the technicalities of the withdrawal decision should not be the focus of the IPC's attention at present. He expressed the hope that the IPC would not operate in a vacuum, and suggested concerned embassies ought to be informed about the IPC review. In his opinion, the views of our allies ought to be taken into account and the various available options ought to be discussed.

Mr. Newell stated that the question before the IPC was neither withdrawal nor the salvaging of UNESCO. The question before

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- 4 -

the IPC, he said, was the implementation of the President's decision to withdraw since insufficient change had occurred. He noted that the NSC memorandum mentioning reconsideration should there be concrete change had been prepared to encourage any reform possible. It was recognized then and has proven to be true now that adequate reform was highly unlikely. Thus, the decision had been made and, while any reform efforts generated by our action were welcomed, they must be seen in the context of our objectives and in light of UNESCO's past history.

Mr. Steiner stated that in his opinion the situation might have changed since last December. Reform may now be occurring and the question was how to encourage it. Having letters of withdrawal from our allies might help. Perhaps, therefore, we ought to talk to a few of them, starting with the UK, to see if additional pressure could be applied to the reform process.

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In further reporting on his discussions in Paris during the recent Executive Board, Mr. Raymond stated that, while he was not satisfied with the level of change, he did see real evidence of change. This view had been reinforced by his conversations with our allies, many of whom noted that mechanisms to encourage further reform had been established and that that in itself was real progress.

Mr. DeVries, representing Dr. Keyworth, stated that OSTP strongly favored withdrawal and the redistribution of our UNESCO contribution to other mechanisms. He stated OSTP was not interested in UNESCO reform but believed U.S. science interests would be better served outside the Organization. He further stated that he believed the NAS agreed with this conclusion, although they were more reluctant to say so because they had some self-interest involved.

Speaking for Mr. Wick, Mr. Courtney stated that Mr. Wick was in full agreement with Dr. Keyworth. Mr. Wick believed we should withdraw from UNESCO as decided last year.

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- 5 -

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The issue of expanding the membership of the IPC was raised. The Chairman noted that the most important practical matter was that there be a clear record and a thorough discussion of the issue. He stated that the views of the IPC members had been clearly stated during the meeting and he is also aware of the Secretary's opinion.

In closing, the Chairman identified three basic questions. First, on the matter of materials for IPC consideration, he suggested that any comments or recommendations be conveyed to Mr. Newell. He also suggested any materials a member wished to have discussed as part of the IPC review should likewise be forwarded to Mr. Newell. While he felt the available opinions of our allies ought to be factored into the IPC's deliberations, he said that these opinions ought not to be actively solicited.

Second, he stated that the IPC ought to consider any options the members wished to develop. The emphasis ought to be on evaluation of the amount of reform achieved but, he stated, the IPC could also analyze options if the White House so desired. In order to consider the degree to which reform had been achieved, he said Mr. Newell would provide to the next IPC meeting his assessment based on available materials.

Third, he stated that he had no problem with the expansion of the IPC membership to include other agencies with a stake in UNESCO. In this regard, he requested views be sent to his office.

Ultimately, the Chairman stated, the goal of the IPC is to analyze reform progress in UNESCO. In planning for the post-withdrawal period, the IPC would also address the issues of ongoing liaison, criteria for our eventual return, strategies to encourage reform, and presentation of an effective case for public diplomacy purposes.

The next IPC meeting was set for November 21, 1984, 2:30 p.m., in room 7240, Main State.

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